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This talk is a survey of two topics of recent interest in mathematical logic	 namely
linear logic and cardinal characteristics of the continuum
 I shall try to explain
enough about each of them to be able to point out how they are connected

Since the underlying ideas of the two topics are quite dierent	 I regard the
existence of a connection as surprising

  Linear Logic
What does an implication A  B mean According to classical logic A  B
is true if and only if either A is false or B is true or both This is regarded as
specifying the meaning of implication because quite generally classical logic
nds the meaning of a statement in the conditions for its being true
According to constructive logic as developed by Brouwer and Heyting a
proof of A   B is a construction converting any proof of A into a proof of
B This is regarded as specifying the meaning of implication because quite
generally constructive logic nds the meaning of a statement in what is required
to prove it
Two close relatives of the BrouwerHeyting interpretation of implication are
Kolmogorov	s interpretation in terms of problems and the CurryHoward inter
pretation in terms of types Kolmogorov regarded statements as representing
problems and interpeted A  B as the problem of reducing B to A ie of solv
ing B given a solution of A Curry and Howard pointed out a correspondence
between logical systems and type theories where propositions correspond to
types which can safely be regarded simply as sets for the purposes of this talk
 
I thank the organizers of the SMC Congress for inviting me to give this talk and I thank
the NSF for partial support under grant DMS	


and A   B is the type of functions from type A to type B If we identify a
proposition with the type of its proofs and identify constructions with func
tions then the CurryHoward correspondence amounts to the BrouwerHeyting
interpretation
The CurryHoward corespondence has been of interest recently in theoreti
cal computer science where one deals with data types and where A  B could
be the type of procedures with a formal variable of type A and a value of type
B
The preceding comments about implication have analogs for other connec
tives For example the conjunction A  B is dened classically as being true
whenever both A and B are true It is dened constructively by saying that
to prove A  B one must give a proof of A and a proof of B Under the
CurryHoward correspondence conjunction becomes the cartesian product of
types
The rst central idea of linear logic introduced in the mid	s by Girard
is to keep track of how often a hypothesis is used in deducing a conclusion
equivalently via the CurryHoward correspondence one keeps track of how
often an input is used in computing an output This and related concepts
seem to me more intuitive in the context of ability to perform actions
rather than knowledge of facts for knowledge is normally permanent and
reusable while abilities can be limited in the sense that someone who can do A
and can do B may not necessarily be able to do both Although it is unclear in
the context of traditional set theory what it would mean for a function to use
an argument a particular number of times the notion is considerably clearer
for algorithmic procedures and is useful for memory management
The formal development of linear logic is based on a sequent calculus In
traditional logic    where  and  are lists of statements means that the
conjunction of the statements in  entails the disjunction of the statements in
 The rst step toward linear logic is to abolish the rule of contraction
 AA  
 A  
which formalized the idea that hypotheses can be reused One hypothesis A
is as good as two copies of it The removal of the contraction rule results
in a system called ane logic In it a sequent    carries the additional
information that each hypothesis is to be used at most once
Linear logic is obtained from ane logic by also abolishing the rule of weak
ening
  
 A  
which formalized the idea that a hypothesis can be ignored In linear logic
   requires that each hypothesis in  is used exactly once
There is also a noncommutative version of linear logic abolishing the rule
of exchange


 
 AB

 

 
 BA

 
Then    requires that the hypotheses be used in the order listed
Girard and others have developed linear logic quite extensively especially
its proof theory but considerably less is known about noncommutative linear
logic From now on I shall talk only about the commutative system
Linear logic	s insistence that hypotheses be used just once raises a question
about the meaning of conjunction Should one use of A and one use of B
constitute one or two uses of AB Girard	s answer is that there are two sorts
of conjunction for which he introduced the notations A  B and AB One
use of A  B consists of a use of A and a use of B One use of AB consists
of one use of A or one use of B whichever the user wants Notice here the
beginning of an interaction between the hypotheses and a user These two
conjunctions are governed by the rules of inference
  A   B
  AB
  A   B
  AB

These rules would be equivalent in the presence of contraction and weakening
The interaction alluded to above between a user requesting information and
hypotheses supplying information or in more customary terminology between
questions and answers leads to the second central idea of linear logic namely
linear negation the operation that interchanges questions and answers An
answer of type A
 
is a question of type A and vice versa
There have been several attempts to model semantically this sort of interac
tion I introduced a game semantics where propositions or types are modeled
by games whose rules specify how the questioner and answerer are to interact
This semantics was modied by Abramsky Jagadeesan Hyland and Ong to
improve its correspondence with Girard	s proof theoretic system
I shall not discuss these developments further here but instead concentrate
on a simpler semantics a special case of de Paiva	s Dialecticalike semantics
Here a proposition is represented by a triple A  A

 A

 A where A

is
the set of questions of type A A

is the set of answers of type A and
A  A

A

is a binary relation holding between any question and its correct
answers
By a morphism from A to B I mean a pair of functions   B

 A

and
  A

 B

such that for all b  B

and a  A


bAa  bBa
In the presence of such a morphism if you can answer questions of type A
then you can also answer questions of type B given a question in B

convert
it with  into a question in A

 produce an answer in A

 and convert it with
 into an answer in B

for the original question
Linear negation is modeled by interchanging questions and answers and
interchanging correct and incorrect


A 
 A

 A

	

A
The connectives  and   are modeled by
AB  A
B
 

B
A
 

 A

B

K
where f gKa b i fbAa and gaBb and
A  B  AB
 

 
 A

B

 A
B
 

B
A
 

 C
where a bCf g if either not fbAa or bBga In using the notation   I
deviate from the standard notation for this linear implication Unfortunately
the standard notation a dash with a little circle at the right end is not in
standard T
E
X One pleasant consequence of these denitions is that a mor
phism A  B is an answer f g that is correct for every question a b in
the sense of A   B De Paiva showed that with suitable interpretations for
the remaining connectives Girard	s proof system is sound for this semantics
In addition as we shall see in the next section parts of this semantics arise
naturally in a quite dierent context
 Cardinal Characteristics of the Continuum
One of set theory	s earliest and most useful contributions to the rest of math
ematics was the distinction between dierent innite cardinals and especially
the distinction between countable innity 


 and the cardinality of the con
tinuum c  



 This made it possible to do things in some innite situations
countable ones that would be impossible for continuumsized ones Examples
include the Baire category theorem and the countable additivity of Lebesgue
measure Whenever as in these examples 


and c behave dierently one can
ask where between these the behavior changes Of course if one believes the
continuum hypothesis CH ie c  

 
 then this question is trivial But it
is consistent with the usual axioms of set theory ZFC that there are many
cardinals between 


and c and then it is reasonable to consider cardinals like
the following
 covB is the minimum number of meager sets countable unions of nowhere
dense sets whose union is R The B stands for Baire
 addB is the minimum number of meager sets in R whose union is not
meager
 d is the minimum number of functions N  N needed to eventually domi
nate every such function
 b is the minimum number of functions N  N such that no single function
eventually dominates them all
These and many other cardinal numbers of a similar nature are called cardinal
characteristics of the continuum and many connections mostly inequalities


are known between them there are also many independence results saying that
dierent values of these characterisitics are consistent with ZFC
For the cardinals dened above the provable inequalities include


 
 addB 
 
b
covB

 d  



The characteristics for Baire category dened above have analogs for Lebesgue
measure just replace meager with measure zero in the denitions and re
place B with L in the notations It is a surprising theorem of Bartoszynski
that addL  addB This inequality like each of the inequalities exhibited
above can consistently be strict and can consistently reduce to equality
The denitions of many of the cardinal characteristics and the proofs of
many of the inequalities between them including all those mentioned above
t into the following framework apparently rst used by Miller and Fremlin
and explicitly formulated by Vojtas
For two sets A

and A

and a relation A  A

 A

as in de Paiva	s
semantics described in the preceding section dene
kA

 A

 Ak  minfjZj j Z  A

andx  A

z  ZxAzg
Such norms include all the characteristics dened above
Let M be the set of meager sets or codes for meager F

sets Then
covB  kRMk
addB  kMM k
Let 

be the eventual majorization ordering on N
N
 Then
d  kN
N
N
N


k
b  kN
N
N
N
 

k
If there is a morphism A  B then kAk  kBk All the inequalities
mentioned above can be deduced from this general fact by constructing explicit
morphisms Since the inequalities all become trivial when CH holds I once
hoped that the existence of morphisms might remain nontrivial and capture
even in the presence of CH the essential content of the proofs of the inequalities
Yiparaki showed that this is not the case CH provides morphisms as well
as inequalities But it does not provide Borel morphisms ie morphisms
whose components  and  are Borel functions while the usual proofs of the
inequalities do produce Borel morphisms So at the moment Borel morphisms
seem to capture the essence of the usual proofs of these inequalities
There are a few known inequalities involving three cardinal characteristics
A nice example due to Miller is
addB  minfcovB bg


The reverse inequality follows from those displayed earlier The proofs of
this and similar examples can be formalized in terms of morphisms to objects
constructed by means of the dual of the following sequential composition
connective
AB  A

B
A
 

 A

B

 S
where x fSa b i xAa and faBb This is closely related to de Paiva	s
interpretation of the  of linear logic but it is not commutative In fact the
order of sequential composition is crucial in proofs of inequalities like the one
above It essentially corresponds to the order of arguments and constructions
in proofs of inequalities In many cases it also corresponds to the order in
which forcing constructions should be iterated in order to produce models with
certain special properties In other cases recently studied by Mildenberger
forcing cannot detect the order of steps or even the need for several steps but
subtler combinatorial arguments can

